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C H A R L E S J .  S T I V A L E
Intersections of Science, Sensation, 
and Culture
Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation by Brian Massumi.
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp. viii + 328. $21.95 paper.
If we have somehow previously missed the signs (and texts) of Brian Mas-
sumi’s provocative critical production, Parables for the Virtual: Movement,
Affect, Sensation provides indisputable evidence of the mastery, despite his
efforts to be unmasterful, that Massumi brings to his study of the complex
intersection of science, philosophy, and culture. Given the depth and com-
plexity of the analyses contained in this volume, a review such as this can only
offer a broad outline of the rich and careful work of critical reflection con-
tained therein.
In the introduction, Massumi explains how the volume’s animating con-
cepts overlap. In doing so, he presents himself not as an adversary but as a
severe yet willing ally of contemporary modes of critique, especially cultural
studies. Massumi’s always original analyses offer practical means to think
through and with the body in its material traits that include, but are not lim-
ited to, movement, sensation, and affect. Bergsonian and Deleuzian in inspi-
ration, Massumi’s approach to movement insists on the importance of
passages and becomings over the fixed and static coordinates of positions.
Outlining some fifteen consequences of his adoption of the Bergsonian per-
spective, he adds sensation and intensity to complicate movement and then
develops, through Leibniz, the links between sensation and perception, sen-
sation and memory, and, through Spinoza, sensation and affect (14–15). Mas-
sumi maintains that all of these relations, movements, and intensities concern
the sense in which “the body coincides with its own transitions and its transi-
tioning with its potential” (15), and that such phasing is linked to the body’s
feeling, emergence, and subjectivity. Massumi cautions that, while not all of
these conceptual clusters figure in each essay, they do “appear and reappear
like a revolving cast of characters, joining forces or interfering with each other
in a tumble of abstract intrigue—at times (I admit) barely controlled” (17).
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In short, one finds here a sequence of conceptual role-playing games in
which the stakes are the body and its sensory and affective vicissitudes. The
arc of this “tumble”—from engagement with affect and its cronies as devel-
oped in Deleuze and Guattari (chapter 1) to the paean to incorporeal materi-
alism in conjunction with radical empiricism (chapter 9)—helps Massumi
toward his goal of developing invention and experimentation in the humani-
ties, not by mastering concepts through their application, but by seeking the
singularity of and in well-selected examples. Hence Massumi glories in the
possibility of pursuing these examples through their myriad details and pos-
sible digressions, even “prepared for failure,” in order to reach “not so much
the negation of system as a setting of systems in motion” (18). The method
proposed is one of “creative contagion,” opening the system, connecting con-
cepts between disciplines to “see what happens,” to leave “readers with a very
special gift: a headache . . . a problem: what in the world to do with it all” (19).
Well aware of being charged with “shameless poaching,” of “theft from
science for the humanities” (19), Massumi happily but not naively embraces
such charges. His interest is in radical connectibility of concepts, the very ways
in which “rhythm, relay, arrival and departure” (i.e., affect) enable a two-way
transmission between science and the humanities (20). Massumi understands
the purpose of creating links between science and the humanities as placing
the latter “in a position of having continually to renegotiate their relations
with the sciences—and, in the process, to rearticulate what is unique to their
own capacities” (21). Finally, he explains that since his mode of analysis is
based on examples, he has chosen “parable” for his title to indicate “the genre
of writing most closely allied with the logical form of the example,” a writing
on the incorporeality of the body, that is, the “virtual” (21).
Having thus given a close reading of the introductory pages of Massumi’s
book, I propose to follow a linear outline of how Massumi pursues his exami-
nation of the book’s focal concepts. “The Autonomy of Affect” (chapter 1)
both lays out the initial array of concepts that Massumi elaborates in this and
subsequent chapters and offers lucid exemplars to which these concepts can
be linked and through which they can be better understood. A sequence of
four stories in this chapter relates anecdotes to empirical experiments on per-
ception that raise issues about affect, intensity, sensation, perception, expres-
sion, the virtual, and the actual. These stories frame the chapter’s central
reflection, in which Massumi draws from Gilbert Simondon to consider the
multifaceted concept of “emergence” in its intricate relations with the other
conjoined concepts. Emergence, says Massumi, is “a two-sided coin: one side
in the virtual (the autonomy of relation), the other in the actual (functional
limitation). What is being termed affect in this essay is precisely this two-
sidedness, the simultaneous participation of the virtual in the actual and the
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actual in the virtual” (35). Massumi ends this central reflection by explaining
what is at stake in considering the nonhuman (aka nature) as more than “a
construct of human culture, or inertness. The concepts of nature and culture
need serious reworking in a way that expresses the irreducible alterity of the
nonhuman in and through its active connection to the human and vice versa”
(39; emphasis in the original here and throughout).
In subsequent chapters, Massumi turns to different ways in which the
actual and virtual intersect and emerge through various manifestations of cor-
poreality. In “The Bleed: Where Body Meets Image” (chapter 2), he starts from
the tale of Ronald Reagan’s life-changing experience of sensing his body as an
amputee for his role in the film King’s Row (key line: “Where’s the rest of me?”).
This crucial event in Reagan’s life, says Massumi, constitutes an example of “the
bleed,” “a blend between the exemplary event and [Reagan’s] ordinary world”
(56). This example helps Massumi to propose a broad range of issues, most
notably the temporal and spatial relations of the body as they intersect with per-
ceptions, sensations, and their attendant affects. Then, in the chapter’s final sec-
tion, he links the exemplary event to questions of the unity of ideal images and
emotions and to concepts that relate to the partial nature of such unity. Massumi
addresses related questions in different ways throughout the book: “The Polit-
ical Economy of Belonging: The Logic of the Relation” (chapter  3) considers
the problem of the “in-between” as it concerns the example of the “field” (in
terms of sports, art, politics, the media) and thus also play and the becoming of
the event. “The Evolutionary Alchemy of Reason: Stelarc” (chapter 4) takes the
modes of creative expression—physical suspensions, televisual exploration of
internal organs, prosthetic extensions, among others—practiced by the Aus-
tralian “body artist,” Stelarc, as the exemplar for considering the problem: “In
what way is the body an idea, and the idea bodily? In what way can probing one
extend the other? ‘How is it that the body thinks itself? ’” (90; Massumi citing Ste-
larc in a 1992 interview). “On the Superiority of the Analog” (chapter 5) offers
a different angle on the virtual (and, necessarily, the actual), that “digital tech-
nologies have a connection to the potential and the virtual only through the ana-
log” (138). Providing exemplars from forms of computing, televiewing, and the
web, Massumi observes: “All the sense modalities are active in even the most
apparently monosensual activity. Vision may ostensibly predominate, but it
never occurs alone. Every attentive activity occurs in a synesthetic field of sen-
sation that implicates all the sense modalities in incipient perception, and is
itself implicated in self-referential action” (140). Massumi’s conclusion is that
rather than finding our location in a “digital age,” “the challenge is to think (and
act and sense and perceive) the co-operation of the digital and the analog, in
self-varying continuity. . . . The analog and the digital must be thought together,
asymmetrically. Because the analog is always a fold ahead” (143).
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In many ways, chapter 5 lays the groundwork for the three chapters that
follow, since the discussion of the virtual and its interrelations with the senses
occurs in different ways in each: chapter 6, “Chaos in the ‘Total Field’ of Vision”
(considering, among other things, the tactile, haptic function of vision); chap-
ter 7, “The Brightness Confound” (on anomalies of vision, considering the gaps
between differing empirical and philosophical accounts regarding the field of
color as well as creativity); and chapter 8, “Strange Horizon: Buildings, Bio-
grams, and the Body Topologic” (on the body understood in topological terms,
and topological design in terms of corporeality). These are, of course, mere
thumbnail summaries, but I hope to convey the nexus of concerns around
which each of Massumi’s analyses center: most notably, the body, its myriad
sensations, their relations to movement and affect, and how all of these are
viewed from the dual perspective of the humanities and the sciences.
Massumi’s final chapter, “Too-Blue: Color-Patch for an Expanded Empiri-
cism” (originally published in the journal Cultural Studies, in a special issue
on Deleuze and Guattari in cultural studies), constitutes what he calls the
occasion in which “incorporeal materialism meets up with radical empiri-
cism,” where “Bergson, Spinoza, and Simondon” (featured in chapter 1)
“make way for James, who tumbles onto A. N. Whitehead and Isabelle
Stengers” (17). This encounter occurs following the line of analysis well
developed in the preceding four chapters, the persistent juxtaposition of
philosophical concepts with an early-twentieth-century experiment on the
effects of memory on color constancy. Discussion of this empirical test yields
quickly to the interrogation of that in-between zone of the bleed. That is, the
language of the experimenter’s report “operat[es] simultaneously to stan-
dardize (reduce) and convey (express) an ineffable singularity of experience,”
whereas the experiment’s subject “has been singularly struck by color” such
that color “has gone over the instituted line, pushed past the mark set for it 
by the laboratory setup” (211). Massumi reflects on the diverse contours 
of this singularity of experience in order to relate a “philosophical story,” how
the unforeseen of the real, its “inexhaustible reserve of surprise [constitutes]
. . . the snowballing process that makes a certainty of change” (214). Massumi
then draws from James and Whitehead to consider how the proto- or semi-
scientific object may (or may not) develop into a dependable fact, and how
such birth of the technical object must be situated within a global ecology of
knowledge practices.
These observations also serve to foreground Massumi’s detailed review of
the many “process lines” that provide access to and knowledge about an event,
notably the “adoption and imposition by the experimenter of the institutional
setup of the experiment” in contrast to “the self-insistence of an autonomy of
experience” (212). For the climax of this encounter between incorporeal
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materialism and radical empiricism lies in Massumi’s examination of the lim-
its of research in the sciences and in philosophy, on one hand, and in cultural
studies, on the other. If he makes a polemical turn in the last ten pages of the
book, it is in response to what he deems to be the moralistic process line in sci-
ence that would speak “in the name of a universal ‘we’ that is a thinly disguised
assertion of a restricted ‘we’s’ exclusive right to existence based on monopoly
access to the ‘laws’ and ‘principles’ ‘behind’ empirical reality” (246–47)—in
short, science’s “becoming-theological—whether it cares to admit it or not”
(247–48). Castigated particularly by classical-empiricist fundamentalists
such as Edward O. White are three “horrific” dimensions: philosophy, art, and
cultural studies. While Massumi makes a case for intersections between the
sciences and all three dimensions, he concludes, reluctantly but frankly, that
few of the process lines he describes yet allow for the kinds of expansion of the
empirical field that he judges as both possible and necessary, especially in cul-
tural studies, which, says Massumi, “has missed the processual boat” (253).
He states, “As it is widely practiced, cultural studies falls short of singularity
at both limits [on the nature-culture continuum] because it clings to the
notion that expression is of a particularity” (253). Among other things, this
results in “miss[ing] the impersonal or overpersonal excesses of ongoing
transformation,” and cultural studies’s lack of “processual specificity” tends to
push some of its practices toward the “soft sciences” (253). In contrast, he
argues for a political ecology that would emphasize “the coming-together or
belonging-together of processually unique and divergent forms of life. . . .
What cultural studies could become, if it finds a way of expressing its own
processual potential, is a political ecology affectively engaged in symbiosis-
tending, . . . an amoral collective ethics, . . . a tending of coming-together, a
caring for belonging as such” (255).
Massumi’s book imposes considerable demands on the reader’s ability to
follow its intricate latticework of concepts. Still, the author has the singular
merit of speaking to the reader with careful attention, humor, and an ability to
juxtapose complex analyses with engaging exemplars. One caution that I
would make is that readers not take Massumi’s analyses as a substitute for
engaging directly with the many critical works and concepts that he deploys.
Although I have gained immeasurably, for example, from reading the different
ways in which Massumi deploys the concept of affect, I would be loathe now
to employ his work as the sole referent on this concept, when the primary texts
such as those by Spinoza and Deleuze-Guattari, among others, remain crucial
for a nuanced understanding of affect and its conceptual nexus. Furthermore,
while Massumi takes issue with certain aspects of the sciences, philosophy,
and cultural studies, especially in chapter 9, his analyses can properly be
viewed as quite complementary to the diversity in these approaches in order,
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as he himself maintains, to extend these foundations with additional contribu-
tions of his own. In short, perhaps the greatest compliment one can pay to any
theorist is to be paid to Massumi, that his study will not leave the reader indif-
ferent and that it will continue to provoke thought and reaction, but also hence-
forth action and creative production in the complex and mutating domains for
which Massumi’s “parables” unmistakably provide the coordinates.
Wayne State University
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